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CHRIST'S ATONEMENT AS THE 
MODEL FOR CIVIL JUSTICE 
JEFFREY C. TUOMALA 
Nothing is more influential with men than examples of justice. 
Valerius Maxim us 1 
God presented him [Christ Jesus] as a sacrifice of atonement, 
through faith in his blood. He did this to demonstrate his justice, 
because in his forbearance he had left the sins committed before-
hand unpunished [ .] 
Paul the Apostle' 
The implications of the various theories of punishment for sentencing 
and spending policies are well known. Less familiar, though more 
intriguing, is the relationship these theories bear to basic criminal 
law doctrines of legality, mens rea, and defenses. Several current 
casebooks start with a section on punishment and develop this 
relationship with varying degrees of success.' Tying resolution of 
substantive law issues to the basic philosophical questions involved 
in the theories of punishment enriches the study of criminal law, 4 
but it increases frustration and breeds cynicism when those questions 
remain unanswered. Neither policymaker nor jurist can confidently 
make decisions without justifying a theory of punishment. 5 
The critical importance of Christian theology in the development 
of Western criminal law is well documented. 6 Legal doctrines are 
justified by, and maintain coherence as part of, a particular world view. 
l. Hugo Grotius, A Defence of the Catholic Faith Concerning the Satisfaction 
of Christ, against Faustus Socinus (Frank H. Foster, trans. 1889) (1st ed. 1617, 
translated from Amsterdam ed. 1679), p. 98. 
2. Romans 3:25 (all quotations from New International Version). 
3. See, Peter W. Low et al., Criminal Law (1986), pp. 1-28; Richard G. Singer 
and Martin R. Gardner, Crimes and Punishment (1989), pp. 45-211. 
4. See, H. L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (litho. reprint 1970) (1968); 
C.L. Ten, Crime, Guilt, and Punishment (1987). 
5. The problem seems no closer to a resolution today than one hundred years 
ago when Sir Henry Maine observed: "All theories on the subject of punishment 
. have more or less broken down, and we are at sea as to first principles." J.M. 
Finnis, "Old and New in Hart's Philosophy of Punishment," 8 The Oxford Rev. 
(1968), p. 73. 
6. See Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western 
Legal Tradition (1983), and sources cited therein. 
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What happens when the positive rules of the state lose all touch 
with a higher law and come to be seen as nothing more than the 
outcomes of a power struggle? Can the ideals of autonomy and 
generality in law survive the demise of the religious beliefs that 
presided over their birth?' 
The doctrine of Christ's atonement is of singular importance for 
theories of punishment as it is the judicial archetype of the way in 
which God deals with sin and crime. Treatises on the atonement are 
rich with illustrations from, and analogies to, the civil law. Remarkable 
parallels appear between the four principal views of Christ's atonement 
and currently debated theories of civil justice. The civil magistrate, 
as "minister of God for justice," should deal with crime and civil 
wrongs according to the same principles by which God deals with 
sin through the atonement. The justification of a particular theory 
of atonement justifies a corresponding view of civil justice. 8 
THE MEANING OF ATONEMENT 
Because of the centrality of atonement in the Christian faith its 
meaning is as varied as theological systems are diverse. However, all 
views hold in common that the end of atonement is the reconciliation 
of God and man. Properly understood, atonement establishes the 
ground of justice for reconciliation between an offended party and 
the offender. Similarly, civil justice should establish the ground of 
justice for reconciliation of victim and offender and the restoration 
of both. 
There are two paramount questions to be answered in studying the 
atonement. The first is whether Christ's death was necessary as the 
· only means of salvation. The second is whether the primary purpose 
of Christ's death was to change God's disposition toward man or 
man's disposition toward God. 
If Christ's death were not a necessary satisfaction of justice in the 
divine nature then it was merely an arbitrary product of divine will 
subject to change. In such a case Christ's death would be based 
7. Roberto M. Unger, Law in Modern Society (1976), p. 83. 
8. A more direct "religious" approach to justifying a theory of punishment 
would be to study the civil law sections of scripture, but there are three distinct 
advantages to approaching the issue through the atonement. The scriptures treat 
Christ's death much more comprehensively, as redemption is the central theme of 
the Bible. Secondly, the principles of justice as reflected in the atonement have 
received far greater attention than the civil law, so there is more to draw from. 
Thirdly, general principles of justice are not as clear from the biblical case law, and 
that case law often has the appearance of being time-bound. 
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simply on its suitability for accomplishing a particular end, for 
example, deterring sin or moving man to repentance. In a world 
where the archetype of justice is mutable there is little reason to 
expect standards of civil justice to be fixed. Justice as desert would 
be replaced with the utilitarian principle that justifies conduct by the 
test of expediency. 
While the first question relates to means (atonement), the second 
relates to the end (reconciliation). Where sin is a personal offense 
against God, which elicits a personal response of judicial displeasure, 
God's disposition toward man must be dealt with first. God cannot 
simply ignore sin, but rather requires satisfaction of justice. The 
sinner's reconciliation to God can only follow upon God's 
reconciliation to man. Alternatively, if sin is merely a sickness or 
impersonal offense against the good order of God's government, 
then only man's disposition toward God need be changed to restore 
their relationship. The focus would be on future rather than past 
behavior, and justice's only demand would be personal reformation. 
Where crimes are seen as offenses against individuals rather than 
against an impersonal state, satisfaction must be made to the victim 
and the demands of justice. The criminal's hatred of his victim may 
still exist, but the objective ground for reconciliation has been laid-
he has made satisfaction to the victim, and his own guilt is removed. 
When the civil justice system focuses on changing the criminal's 
behavior or character, the victim is left with a sense of injustice and 
the offender with a burden of guilt. The opportunity for reconciliation 
and restoration is lost. 
THE FOUR Vmws OF ATONEMENT AND CrviL JusTICE 
The satisfaction, governmental, moral influence, and mystical 
theories of atonement' correspond to retribution, deterrence, 
rehabilitation, and social justice. 10 The satisfaction theory teaches 
that justice is an immutable attribute of God's character demanding 
9. There are various schemes for categonzmg the theories. This particular 
scheme, with some variations, is found in numerous evangelical Calvinist and 
Arminian theologies of the past two centuries. 
10. Although it is common to treat retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation as 
the chief theories of criminal sanctions, it is not at all usual to list social justice as 
a category. I have done this for several reasons. Critical theories of criminology are 
a type of social justice theory and do not fall under the traditional categories. Also, 
Christ's atonement has an importance for civil justice that goes beyond punishment. 
And finally, even the issue of punishment, narrowly defined, cannot be properly 
addressed and understood except in a larger context. 
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full payment of the law's penal and compensatory sanctions for 
man's sin. It alone holds that Christ's vicarious death was necessary 
to satisfy justice as a condition of salvation, and that its primary 
effect was to change God's judicial disposition toward man. Likewise, 
only retribution requires punishment based on moral desert and does 
not focus on its prospective effect on the offender. 
The governmental and moral influence theories concede that man 
deserves punishment, but they deny that anything in God's nature 
requires it. Christ's work is not a vicarious satisfaction of justice, 
but rather the most efficient means of inducing a change of behavior, 
either through fear by his exemplary death (governmental) or through 
love by his exemplary life and death (moral influence). Deterrence 
and rehabilitation similarly justify sanctions in terms of their utility 
in promoting the social goal of behavioral change through fear or 
treatment. 
Christ's death is basically irrelevant in the mystical theory which 
teaches that through the incarnation humanity· is divinized, thus 
effecting an essential oneness of God and man. Social justice theories 
parallel this in that moral fault and sanctions are irrelevant to the 
goal of promoting community or reconciliation of all within society. 
Atonement theories cannot be viewed in isolation from the 
theological systems to which they belong. A particular view of 
atonement entails a view of human nature and of the Holy Spirit. 
All of the atonement theories except satisfaction confuse the work 
of Christ and the Holy Spirit and have a fallacious view of sin and 
human nature. This has an important parallel in views of civil justice 
which confuse the jurisdictions of church and state. Christ's work 
establishes an objective basis for reconciliation by satisfying justice, 
while the Holy Spirit makes reconciliation a subjective reality by 
revealing truth and transforming lives. The state is entrusted with 
the ministry of justice through the power of the sword," while the 
church is entrusted the ministry of reconciliation 12 through the power 
of the Spirit. Just as God has not given the church the sword of 
steel necessary to exact justice, he has not given the state the sword 
of the Spirit" necessary to transform the sin nature of wrongdoers 
and reconcile parties. 
11. Romans 13:4: "For he [the civil magistrate] is God's servant to do you 
good. But if you do wrong be afraid, for he does not bear the sword for nothing. 
He is God's servant, an agent of wrath to bring punishment on the wrongdoer." 
12. 2 Corinthians 5:19b-20: "And he has committed to us the message of 
reconciliation. We "re therefore Christ's ambassadors, as though God were making 
his apPeal through us. We implore you on Christ's behalf: Be reconciled to God." 
13. Ephesians 6:17. 
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I. DEONTOLOGICAL THEORIES OF ATONEMENT AND CIVIL JUSTICE 
A. SATISFACTION THEORY OF ATONEMENT 
Anselm's (1033-1109) epic work, Why God Became Man," was the 
first thorough and scientific exposition of the atonement. His most 
significant contribution was the idea that man's salvation is conditioned 
on demands of justice that only Christ's death could satisfy." Anselm 
began with the premise that disobedience robs God of his due and 
thus dishonors him. 16 To restore God's honor justice demands 
punishment or satisfaction. 17 Since punishment would destroy man, 
thereby thwarting God's creation purposes, he looks to satisfaction. 18 
In Roman civil law, satisfaction meant paying the victim for the 
wrong done, or returning a stolen item, plus an extra payment for 
dishonoring the victim. 19 For several reasons man cannot render 
satisfaction to God. First, he has a continuing duty of complete 
obedience so he has nothing to pay for past wrongs. Second, his sin 
incurs an infinite debt. And thirdly, his sin nature renders him 
impotent to do good.20 Since only God could make satisfaction, and 
only man should, salvation necessitated the incarnation of Jesus 
Christ, the God-man, whose death paid our infinite debt thus restoring 
God's honor.'1 His death was not a punishment for man or in man's 
place.22 
Anselm drew on three sources of analogy for his theory. Both 
Roman law and the church doctrine of penance provided models for 
satisfaction (payment) and for punishment. The punishment model 
was found in Roman public law and in the Church doctrine of 
penance as self-inflicted injury. The satisfaction model was found in 
Roman civil law and in penance as performance of some good or as 
14. Anselm of Canterbury, in A Scholastic Miscellany: Anselm to Ockham 
(Eugene R. Fairweather, ed. & trans. 1956), p. 100. The Library of Christian Classics 
(John Bailie et al., eds. 1953-69), vol. 10. 
15. Robert S. Franks, The Work of Christ (1962), p. 128: "Nowhere is his 
theory more revolutionary." 
16. A Scholastic Miscellany: Anselm to Ockham, bk. I, ch. xi. 
17. Ibid., bk. I, ch. xix. 
18. Ibid., bk. 2, ch. iv. 
19. Ibid., bk. I, ch. xi. 
20. Ibid., bk. I, ch. xx; bk. 2, ch. xiv; bk. I, ch. xxiv. 
21. Ibid., bk. 2, ch. vi. 
22. The Work of Christ, p. 137: "For the remarkable thing about Anselm's 
theory is his distinction of satisfaction from punishment, and his avoidance of the 
idea that Christ's satisfaction is the vicarious endurance of our punishment, whether 
as self-inflicted or inflicted by God." 
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a gift to God. Anselm based the justice of Christ's atonement not 
on vicarious punishment but on payment as positive performance of 
some good.23 Germanic law focused on lost honor which could be 
restored by punishment or payment that was calculated not on the 
basis of moral demerit, but rather on the amount of harm done to, 
and status of, the victim. For Anselm it became God's honor rather 
than his righteousness that required satisfaction. 24 
Anselm's reliance on the private law analogy became a vortex of 
criticism. It is generally recognized that private debt may be forgiven 
without injustice. It logically follows that Christ's death was not 
necessary as God could have simply forgiven man's debt without 
payment. To require either payment or punishment appears to negate 
God's mercy. 
The Protestant Reformers accepted Anselm's premise that Christ's 
death was a necessary condition of man's salvation; however, they 
believed that punishment is a necessary component of atonement. 
Man must be punished, or Christ must vicariously endure the 
punishment man deserves. This view, which John Calvin (1509-1564) 
set out in the Institutes of the Christian Religion,'-' became the 
measure of Protestant orthodoxy. 
The Reformers taught that God created man righteous and governed 
their relationship by a covenant of law, rewarding obedience with 
life and disobedience with death.26 All men were on probation in 
Adam whose sin brought guilt and a sentence of death on all 
mankind. As a result, everyone is born with a sin nature that 
inevitably produces specific sinful acts, both of which deserve 
punishment. 27 As sin is a personal offense against God and not 
against an impersonal government, His judicial disposition toward 
sin is one of wrath and determination to exact justice.28 
23. Ibid., pp. 135-37; See also, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the 
Western Legal Tradition. pp. 68-72, 172-73. 
24. The Work of Christ, pp. 138-40. See generally Law and Revolution: The 
Formation of the Western Legal Tradition, pp. 49-84 (ch. 1). 
25. John Calvin, The Institutes of the Christian Religion (Henry Beveridge, 
trans. 1845, photolithoprint 1981). Modern works from the Reformed perspective 
include Archibald A. Hodge, The Atonement (reprint 1987) (1867); Benjamin B. 
Warfield, The Person and Work of Christ (Samuel G. Craig, ed. 1980); and John 
Murray, Redemption Accomplished and Applied (1955). · 
26. The Institutes of the Christian Religion, bk. I, ch. xv; Genesis 1:27-29; 2:15-
17; 3:14-24. See also Exodus 24 and Deuteronomy 28 (these events were covenant 
renewal ceremonies). 
27. The Institutes of the Christian Religion, bk. 2, cbs. i-iii and ch. xvi, para. 
3; Romans 3:9-23; 5:12-21; Ephesians 2:3; Psalm 51:5. See also The Atonement, 
ch. vii. 
28. The Institutes of the Christian Religion, bk. 2, ch. xvi, para. I; Psalm 51:3-
4;- Romans 1:18. 
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Yet even while man chose to be an enemy of God and was under 
his wrath, God loved man and sent his son to fulfill all the demands 
of justice in man's place by his life and his death. 29 Scripture 
characterizes Christ's death not only as a punishment but as a 
payment. Justice demands both.30 An offender deserves to be punished 
(retribution) and he owes payment (restitution) to the offended party. 
Christ's judicially imposed death on Calvary as punishment and 
payment was typified and prophesied in the Old Testament.'1 While 
Christ's death satisfied the negative aspects of the law, his life of 
perfect obedience satisfied the positive requirements, meriting the 
reward of eternal life. 32 
God did not have to save man, but having chosen to, the only 
means compatible with justice was Christ's substitutionary atonement. 
He could not simply remit punishment nor accept less than full 
satisfaction without himself acting unjustly. 33 In so doing he does 
29. The Institutes of the Christian Religion, bk. 2, ch. xvi, para. 4: For it was 
not after we were reconciled to him by the blood of his Son that he began to love 
us, but he loved us before the foundation of the world, that with his only-begotten 
Son we too might be sons of God before we were anything at all. 
Romans 5:9-11; Ephesians 2:4-5; Colossians 1:21; I John 4:7-12. 
30. The Institutes of the Christian Religion, bk. 2, ~h. xii, para. 3: supra note 
25, at bk. 2, ch. xii, para. 3: 
Therefore our Lord came forth very man, adopted the person of Adam, and 
assumed His name, that he might in his stead obey the Father; that he might 
present our flesh as the price of satisfaction to the just judgment of God, and 
in the same flesh pay the penalty which we had incurred. 
Isaiah 53:5: "But he was pierced for our transgressions, he was crushed for our 
iniquities; the punishment that brought us peace was upon him, and by his woundS 
we are healed." 1 Peter 2:24: "He himself bore our sins in his body on the tree, 
so that we might die to sins and live for righteousness; by his wounds you have 
been healed." Psalm 49:7-9: "No man can redeem the life of another or give to 
God a ransom for him-the ransom for a life is costly, no payment is ever enough~ 
that he should live on forever and not see decay." 1 Peter 1:18-19: "For you know 
that it was not with perishable things such as silver or gold that you were redeemed 
from the empty way of life handed down to you from your forefathers, but with 
the precious blood of Christ, a lamb without blemish or defect." 
31. The ceremonial law, in particular the sacrificial system, is typical of Christ's 
work on the cross (e.g., John 1:29; Hebrews 10:1-7). Redemption was both by 
payment (e.g., the temple tax of Exodus 30:12-16, release of slaves in Leviticus 
25:25-28, and cost of sacrificial offerings) and by substitutionary death (e.g., animal 
sacrifices of Leviticus 1-7). See also The Atonement, ch. viii. 
32. The Institutes of the Christian Religion, bk. 2, ch. xvi, para. 5; bk. 2, ch. 
xvii. Reformed theologians refer to Christ's death on the cross in satisfaction of 
the negative demands of justice as his passive obedience while his life of sinless 
perfection in satisfaction of the positive demands as his active obedience. By the 
first he secured man's pardon; by the second he secured the reward of eternal life. 
Romans 5:10; 6:5-7; Galatians 4:7. See also The Atonement, ch. xviii. 
33. The Institutes of the Christian Religion, bk. 2, ch. xii, para. I; Matthew 
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not conform to a principle of justice that exists independently of 
himself, but rather to the eternal personal attributes of his own 
character. Since his very character is just, all of his laws and ways 
reflect his justice. Justice is not the product simply of God's will, 
but rather of his unchanging nature. 34 
Through Christ's substitutionary death the objective ground for 
the expiation (removal) of man's guilt, and thereby the propitiation 
(appeasement) of God's wrath, was established. Christ's work is the 
objective ground for God's reconciliation to man and man's to God." 
As all men enter the world under the guilt of sin and wrath of God, 
there remains a need to apply the benefits of Christ's work 
experientially to individuals. This subjective application of the benefits 
of the atonement is the work of the Holy Spirit." 
Due to the moral corruption inherited from Adam no one is able 
to satisfy the terms of the covenant of law." God has established a 
new covenant that man might have forgiveness of sin and eternal 
life on the condition of faith in Christ's work. 38 But his spiritual 
condition is so desperate that he is unable to exercise faith as a 
meritorious ground of salvation. The very faith by which he trusts 
in Christ is a gift from God.39 Because all men are hopelessly dead 
in sin, it is only after a spiritual birth (regeneration) by the work of 
the Holy Spirit that one can exercise this gift of faith. 40 Justified by 
26:42; Romans 3:25-26; Galatians 2:21; Hebrews 9:22. Romans 3:25-26 is one of 
the most important passages on the forensic significance of Christ's death. The 
position that Christ's death was necessary is defended in C.E.B. Cranfield, The 
Epistle to the Romans (1975), Vol. I, pp. 208-18; and John Murray, The Epistle to 
the Romans (vol. 1 1959, vol. 2 1965), Vol. I, pp. 116-21. 
34. Deuteronomy 32:4; Psalm 92:15; Matthew 5:48; Revelation 4:8. See also The 
Atonement, ch. xvi. 
35. The Institutes of the Christian Religion, bk. 2, ch. xvi, para. 2: "[Christ] 
with his own blood expiated the sins which rendered them hateful to God, by this 
expiation satisfied and duly propitiated God the Father, by this intercession appeased 
his anger, [and] on this basis founded peace between God and man .... " Romans 
3:25; Hebrews 2:17; I John2:1-2; 4:10 (see King James Version for its rendering 
of these verses). 
36. Romans 8. See also The Atonement, ch. xiv. 
37. The Institutes of the Christian Religion, bk. 2, ch. iv, para. I; Romans 6:15-
23; 7:7-25. 
38. All of the redemptive covenants with man since the fall have been covenants 
of grace, including the Mosaic. The New Covenant is different not because it is a 
covenant of grace rather than law, but because the mediator of that covenant is 
Jesus Christ, God's own Son. 
39. The Institutes of the Christian Religion, bk. 2, ch. iii, para. 8; Ephesians 
2:8-10. 
40. Commenting on 2 Thessalonians 2:13 Calvin reminds the reader that "faith 
itself is produced only by the Spirit." Ibid., bk. 3, ch. i, para. 4. Calvin further 
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faith the believer no longer stands under the sentence of death. 41 
God having been reconciled to man by the work of Christ, man is 
now reconciled to God through the work of the Holy Spirit. But 
salvation is both a crisis experience (regeneration and justification) 
and a growth process (sanctification) in which the entire nature of 
man is being transformed to conform to the image of God in which 
he was created.42 The believer is reconciled to God and is being 
reconciled to God through the agency of the Holy Spirit. The 
Reformers clearly distinguished the work of Christ establishing the 
objective ground for reconciliation (redemption accomplished) and 
the work of the Holy Spirit effecting an actual reconciliation 
(redemption applied). All of the other views of atonement denigrate 
the work of the Holy Spirit or deny his existence as a distinct person 
in the Trinity. 
B. RETRIBUTION-RESTITUTION 
There are several varieties of retributivism, which, despite their 
negative connotation, have had numerous proponents past and 
present. 43 It holds that criminals deserve punishment proportionate 
to the moral blameworthiness of their offense. Punishment is not 
justified by its usefulness as a means to attain the ends of reducing 
crime or rehabilitating criminals. In its logical and strongest form 
the magistrate must punish to the full measure of desert. 44 
Retribution has several attractive features which most utilitarians 
try to incorporate, only to compromise their own position. Since law 
has a necessary moral content it places limits on what conduct can 
be criminalized. In fact, the entire guilt-finding process with its focus 
on mens rea is premised on the retributive presupposition that human 
beings are morally responsible. 45 The state may punish only the guilty, 
and punishment is limited by desert. 46 The retributive position gives 
the entire criminal process, from criminalization to adjudication to 
punishment, a coherence. 
There are two basic approaches to justifying the retributive theory. 
explains that "we require a transformation not only in external works but in the 
soul itself." Ibid., bk. 3, ch. ill, para. 6. John 3:1-21; Ephesians 2:1; Titus 3:5-7. 
41. Romans 8:1; See also Romans 1:17; 3:24; 5:1-9. 
42. The Institutes of the Christian Religion, bk. 3, ch; ii, para. 33: "For the 
Spirit does not merely originate faith, but gradually increases it, until by its means 
he conducts us into the heavenly kingdom." Ephesians 3:16-21. 
43. See Crime, Guilt, and Punishment, ch. 3; John Cottingham, "Varieties of 
Retribution," 29 The Phil. Q. (1979), p. 238. 
44. I. Kant, Rechtslehre, pp. 195-97 (E. Hastie, trans. 1887), quoted in Edmund 
L. Pincoffs, The Rationale of Legal Punishment (1966), pp. 2-3. 
45. Punishment and Responsibility, pp. 28-53. 
46. Ibid., pp. 1-27; Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 
(1968), pp. 62-70. 
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The first is that it is a fundamental moral postulate based in some 
theory of ethics, such as natural law or tradition. 47 The second 
approach attempts to justify retribution as a necessary correlate of 
some general political theory, such as social contract.•• This approach 
is fairly well regarded, but it simply shifts the basic problem to that 
of justifying the political theory. 
There are three general forms of attack on the retributive theory. 
The first is to portray it in pejorative terms as the unworthy sentiment 
of vengeance thinly disguised.•• The second is to "expose" the 
underlying ethical theory as little more than intuitionism. 50 The third, 
and most important approach, is to level the charge that all varieties 
of retributivism ultimately appeal to utilitarian arguments for 
justification." C.L. Ten's summary and critique of retributive theories 
focus on this issue. For example, Nozick's "nonteleological version" 
of retribution argues that punishment reconnects offenders with moral 
values. Ten asks why verbal declarations of these values will not do. 
Nozick' s answer is that only punishment ensures these values will be 
properly internalized. Ten argues that this is rehabilitation or deterrence 
concealed as retribution. 52 
This criticism may hold against most varieties of retributivism but 
not all. Utilitarianism purports to justify those means which produce 
the greatest good for the greatest number. It benefits from the 
perception that it is scientific; however, empiricism is unable to 
justify a vision of the good (ends) and proves to be an inadequate 
47. SeeK. G. Armstrong, "The Retributivist Hits Back," 70 Mind (1961), pp. 
471, 476-77; Jeffrie G. Murphy, "Three Mistakes about Retributivism," 31 Analysis 
(1971), p. 166. 
48. Jeffrie G. Murphy, "Marxism and Retribution," 2 Phil & Pub. Ajf (1973), 
p. 217. 
49. See Igor Primorac, "Is Retributivism Analytic?" 56 Philo. (1981), p. 203; 
"The Retributivist Hits Back," -p. 471. The criticism frequently refers to, and 
misconstrues, the principle of lex talionis, at least as that principle is found in the 
Old Testament. The lex talionis is a rule of proportionality, not revenge. Even a 
cursory reading of biblical law (e.g., Exodus 21: 18-27) makes it clear that it does 
not Sanction a simplistic tit-for-tat system of mutilation or revenge. An example of 
revenge that is the antithesis of biblical justice is found in Lamech's Song (Genesis 
4:23-24). It is an example of deterrence through fear, with no limits of proportion-
ality. 
50. "Three Mistakes about Retributivism," p. 166; Lawrence H. Davies, "They 
Deserve to Suffer", 32 Analysis (1971-72), p. 136; H. J. McCloskey, "Utilitarian 
and Retributive Punishment," 64 The J. of Phil. (1967), p. 91. 
51. This is the main thrust of Ten's entire treatment of retributive theories. 
Crime, Guilt, and Punishment, chs. 3-4. See also "They Deserve to Suffer," p. 
137, critiquing S. Benn & R. Peters, The Principles of Political Thought (n.d.). 
52. Crime, Guilt, and Punishment, pp. 44-46. 
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methodology for choosing efficient means. These issues are addressed 
more fully below after all the utilitarian views of civil justice have 
been presented. The retributivist is just as concerned with promoting 
the greatest good but without compromising his position. A Christian 
view teaches that both the end (good) and means (satisfaction of 
justice) are God-defined. Scripture teaches that God's glory and 
man's happiness (end) are the consequence of obeying God's laws 
(means)." The retributivist's assurance that he can know what is 
truly good, and that the means are sufficient to that end, is based 
on the belief in revealed truth and in a God-governed world." 
To reflect the satisfaction theory, civil sanctions must include 
restitution (payment to the victim) and retribution (payment to the 
offender in cases of crime). Most retributivists have come to equate 
criminal justice with punishment and are often careful to distinguish 
restitution which is seen as a matter exclusively of tort law." 
Despite this fact, there has been an increased concern for victims 
of crime and their role in the justice system.'6 One aspect of this 
concern has been to promote compensation and restitution, but these 
schemes do not seem to fit under retribution, deterrence or 
rehabilitation. Some writers promote restitution as a substitute for 
punishment, which is the same error Anselm made believing justice 
may be satisfied simply by payment." Without both restitution and 
retribution there is no satisfaction of justice, and therefore, no 
objective ground for reconciliation of parties to each other, or 
offenders to the community. 58 Because most victims are without 
means to pursue civil remedies, or the losses are too small to justify 
litigation, there is a cumulation of unsatisfied victims and unreconciled 
53. E.g., Deuteronomy 28; Romans 8:28-30; Ephesians 6:8. 
54. A Scholastic Miscellany: Anselm to Ockham, bk. 2, ch. i. 
55. The Limits of the Criminal Sanction, pp. 23-26; Crime, Guilt, and Punish-
ment, pp. 38-41, 51-52. 
56. Herbert W. Titus, "The Restitutionary Purposes of the Criminal Law," in 
Crime and Punishment in Modern America (Patrick McGuigan & Jon S. Pascale, 
eds. 1986), p. 273; Offender Restitution in Theory and Action (Burt Galaway & Joe 
Hudson, eds. 1978); Considering the Victim (Joe Hudson & Burt Galaway, eds. 
1975); Restitution in Criminal Justice (Joe Hudson & Burt Galaway, eds. 1975); 
Stephen Schafer, Compensation and Restitution to Victims of Crime (2d ed. 1970); 
Assessing the Criminal: Restitution, Retribution and the Legal Process (Randy E. 
Barnett & John Hagel Ill, eds. 1977); Daniel Van Ness, Crime and Its Victims 
(1986). 
57. See Assessing the Criminal: Restitution, Retribution and the Legal Process, 
p. 357; See also Richard A. Epstein, "Crime and Tort: Old Wine in Old Bottles," 
ibid.' p. 231. 
58. Biblical law implements both restitution (e.g., Exodus 22:1-4) and retribution 
(e.g., Exodus 21:12-17; Deuteronomy 25:1-3). 
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offenders which leads to disillusionment and disrespect toward the 
Jaw. Punishment is also necessary to satisfy justice from the victim's 
and society's perspective. 59 The desire to see criminals punished need 
not be irrational or vindictive, and we should be reluctant to call a 
man good who does not respond with some indignation toward the 
wickedness he sees in the world and satisfaction in seeing it punished. 
Most writers do not address the question of whether the state has 
a right to punish;"' however, it is answered in the course of showing 
why Christ's atonement is the model for civil justice. Romans 1:18-
32 says that the "wrath of God is revealed from heaven" against all 
sin, and that because of this revelation in nature and the conscience, 
all men know they are under judgment. Romans 13: 1-7 says that 
God established the state with the magistrate as his servant, who is 
"an agent of wrath to bring punishment on the wrongdoer." As an 
agent exercising delegated authority, the magistrate must administer 
justice by the same principles that God dealt with all sin through 
Christ's atonement. 
The civil magistrate's authority, as delegated from God and modeled 
on the atonement, is severely limited when compared to the· practices 
of modern states. Contrary to conventional wisdom, 61 the sphere of 
activities subject to state intrusion is limited by connecting Jaw and 
morality. First, the state has no authority to criminalize acts that are 
not morally wrong. The modern state is a major offender of this 
principle. Second, even though God's judgment is against all sin, 
including thoughts, the civil magistrate has authority only over 
conduct. Third, he has authority to criminalize only some kinds of 
immoral conduct.62 Even though all crime is sin (immorality) not all 
sin is to be punished as crime. 
59. There are other authors who argue that the focus should not be primarily 
on the offender. See Ronald J. Rychlak, "Society's Moral Right to Punish: A 
Further Exploration of the Denunciation Theory of Punishment,'' 65 Tul. L. Rev. 
(1990), p. 299. Rychlak focuses on the impact of punishment on law abiding society 
rather than the victim. See also Richard Burgh, "Guilt, Punishment, and Desert," 
in Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions (Ferdinand Schoeman, ed. -1987), p. 
316. 
60. "The Retributivist Hits Back," pp. 473-74; Egon Bittner & Anthony Platt, 
"The Right of the State to Punish," excerpted from "The Meaning of Punishment," 
2 Issues in Criminology (1966), vol. 2, p. 82, in Contemporary- Punishment: Views, 
Explanations and Justifications (Rudolph J. Gerber & Patrick D. McAnany, eds. 
1972), p. 24. 
61. J.D. Mabbott, "Punishment," 49 Mind (1939), p. 152, reprinted in Theories 
of Punishment (Stanley E. Grupp, ed. 1971), pp. 41, 43-44. 
62. Unlike the first two principles, this principle cannot be drawn from the 
Romans 13 passage or the principles of justice involved in Christ's atonement. It 
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The principle of delegated authority places further strictures on 
the state. It has no institutional authority to establish or administer 
programs designed to change the character of offenders or potential 
offenders." Although retribution-restitution's focus is essentially 
backward-looking, by satisfying the demands of justice it restores 
victims and expiates guilt thereby establishing a basis for reconciliation 
of the offender to his victim, the community and himself. 
As God's agent of grace the church also has an expressly delegated 
and limited authority. Its institutional role includes proclaiming truth, 
disciplining individuals and nations, feeding the poor, restoring 
relationships, and promoting community.64 To exercise this ministry 
of reconciliation the church is entrusted with "the sword of the 
Spirit," fulfilling its role as gifted and empowered by the Holy 
Spirit. 65 Through the church's ministry the Holy Spirit applies the 
salvation Christ secured. The reconciliation of man to God provides 
the exclusive basis for the reconciliation of man to man and for true 
community.66 Just as there is a distinction between the work of Christ 
and the work of the Holy Spirit, there is a corresponding separation 
of state and church. The modern state is notorious for neglecting 
justice and appropriating the role of the church, a role for which 
the state is neither entrusted nor empowered. 
II. UTILITARIAN THEORIES OF ATONEMENT AND CIVIL JUSTICE 
A. MoRAL INFLUENCE THEORY OF ATONEMENT 
In his Exposition of the Epistle to the Romans67 Abelard (1079-
1142) portrayed Christ's death as an exemplary demonstration of 
God's love designed to elicit a loving response from man.•• He 
can only be prOven by an appeal more generally to principles of law and justice 
found in scripture. Generally, the state in scripture has a limited subject matter 
jurisdiction. As God's agent, with a ministry of justice, the state may use coercion 
only in those situations where there is a delegation of authority. 
63. Biblically this is the jurisdiction of the family (e.g., Deuteronomy 6:4-9; 
Ephesians 6:4) and the church (e.g., Deuteronomy 33:10; Acts 2:42). 
64. John 16:5-15; Romans 15:5; 2 Corinthians 5:11-21. 
65. The Institutes of the Christian Religion, bk. 2, ch. xvi, para. 16; Ephesians 
6:17. 
66. Psalm 133; John 17:23; Ephesians 4:1-6. 
67. A Scholastic Miscellany: Anselm to Ockham, p. 276. 
68. Ibid, p. 283: 
Now it seems to us that we have been justified by the' blood of Christ and 
reconciled to God in this way: through his unique act of grace manifested to 
us-in that his Son has -taken upon himself our nature and preserved therein 
in teaching us by word and example even unto death-he has more fully bound 
us to himself by love; with the result that our hearts should be enkindled by 
such a gift of divine grace, and true charity should not now shrink from 
enduring anything for him. 
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believed that God was willing and able to remit man's deserved 
punishment without any satisfaction to the demands of justice. 69 
Although Abelard taught that forgiveness of sin and reconciliation 
to God are not conditioned upon Christ's satisfaction of justice, they 
are conditioned upon man's moral reformation and obedience of the 
law. 70 Man is justified by his own righteousness rather than the 
imputation of Christ's righteousness. Christ's life, teaching, and death 
were not a necessary manifestation of God's love, but they were the 
most efficacious means of influencing this moral change. 71 
Faustus Socinus (1539-1604) revived the moral influence theory in 
De Jesu Christo Servatore (1594)'2 engaging in a virulent polemic 
against the satisfaction theory. His basic premise was that punitive 
justice is not an essential attribute of God's nature; therefore, 
punishment may be remitted purely at will. Like Abelard, Socinus 
taught that God had determined to remit punishment, not upon 
satisfaction of justice, but upon condition of belief in Christianity 
and obedience. 73 God pardons those who are reconciled to him in 
response to Christ's loving example.74 
Socinus rejected the orthodox doctrines of sin, the divinity of 
Christ, and the Trinity. He taught that the only effect of Adam's . 
sin was to set a bad example. Consequently, man's moral condition 
was not nearly as desperate as the Reformers believed.7' Since Christ 
was only a mortal man, though superior in many ways, he has no 
exclusive role to play in salvation. Thus, all men have the potential 
to exercise the same quality of saving influence over others through 
69. lbid., p. 283. 
70. Ibid., p. 279. 
71. Ibid., p. 282. 
72. This work [hereinafter De Jesu] has never been translated into English. See 
The Polish Brethren (George H. Williams, trans., ed., & interpreter 1980), p. 255. 
Franks' treatise on the atonement, The Work of Christ, pp. 362w73, contains portions 
of De Jesu in English. The Racovian Catechism (1605) reflects Socinus' view of the 
atonement and his theology in general. 
73. Socinus writes that "[s]alvation proceeds from the mere will of God in 
pardoning sinners, but is made known by Christ, the only further condition being 
our faith and obedience." De Jesu, pt. I, ch. ii; The Work of Christ, p. 365. See 
also- Racovian Catechism: "But when it is fitting t\lat God remit sins and punish 
when he wishes, it appears that mercy and justice ... do not exist by nature, but 
that it is rather the effect of his will." The Polish Brethren, p. 224. 
74. Racovian Catechism: "First, nowhere does Scripture_ assert that God is 
reconciled to us by Christ but rather that by Christ or his death we are reconciled 
or reconciled to God .... Therefore, in no way from all these passages is that 
satisfaction to be inferred." Ibid., p. 226. See also The Work of Christ, p. 366, 
commenting ori De Jesu, pt. II, ch. vi. 
75. Racovian Catechism, The Polish Brethren, p. 229. 
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their teaching and exemplary lives. 76 Since moral reformation is 
effected by purely natural means as they affect the mind, will, and 
affections, there is no need for the supernatural operation of the 
Holy Spirit in man's salvation." The logical conclusion of these 
departures from orthodoxy is that the church, among other institutions, 
has no separate jurisdiction nor unique ministry of reconciliation. 
Socinus posed two major criticisms of the satisfaction theory. The 
first dealt with the relation of God's justice and mercy; the second 
dealt with the justness of vicarious punishment. He argued that there 
is no place for forgiveness or mercy if salvation is conditioned upon 
a satisfaction of justice. 78 Socinus depicted God as a sovereign lord 
and as a private creditor and not as a judge. 79 He granted that a 
judge may not relax the demands of justice in civil or criminal cases. 
However, a sovereign lord may relax punishment without 
compromising justice because punishment is due to the state. Likewise, 
creditors may forgive debts without injustice since payment is owed 
to them. Therefore, as sovereign lord, God may remit punishment, 
and as private creditor, he may forgive debt without injustice. He 
said the Reformer's belief that Christ's death is a necessary satisfaction 
of justice was sordid and cruel, but he never explained why the 
unnecessary suffering of an innocent man was not sordid and cruel. 
Socinus missed the mark. The Reformers did not sacrifice mercy 
for justice. They taught that God's love and mercy were fully 
operative, moving him to provide his own son as a substitutionary 
atonement. Socinus' view of forgiveness and salvation is in fact the 
greatest tyranny of conscience, and cause for despair, as it is 
conditioned on future habitual obedience of the law, something no 
one is able to do. 
Socinus' second criticism is the most compelling-it is unjust to 
punish the innocent in the place of the guilty. 80 The Reformers 
answered this criticism by pointing to the absolutely unique spiritual 
union between Christ and believers, which Socinus was unwilling to 
recognize. This unique relationship renders Christ's vicarious 
punishment compatible with justice. The Reformers taught that man's 
union with Christ is parallel to man's union with Adam. Adam is 
76. The Work of Christ, p. 363, Quoting Harnack, D.O., vol. 3, p. 791 (4th 
ed. n.d.). 
77. See the answers to Racovian Catechism questions 7, 8 and 9, The Polish 
Brethren, pp. 229-30. 
78. Racovian Catechism, ibid., p. 227. 
79. The Work of Christ, pp. 368-69, summarizing De Jesu, pt. I, ch. i & pt. 
Ill, ch. ii. 
80. The Work of Christ, p. 369, summarizing De Jesu, pt. III, ch. iii. 
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the federal head of fallen men, and Christ is the head of redeemed 
men. Adam's sin is imputed to all men, and Christ's righteousness 
is imputed to all redeemed men." This objective union with Christ 
exists in eternity, was secured in history, and is experienced subjectively 
through the agency of the Holy Spirit. 82 
There is a mystery involved in the union of Christ and believers 
that must be distinguished from the union involved in the mystical 
theory of atonement. Although the church (community) has a ministry 
of reconciliation, man is not reconciled to God through prior 
reconciliation to the church. Rather, personal union with Christ 
through the Holy Spirit is the ground for reconciliation with the 
community. 83 Because the mystical theory of atonement denies the 
essential duality of God and man, it holds that man's union with 
God is effected through his prior union with the community. 84 
B. GOVERNMENTAL THEORY OF ATONEMENT 
Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) formulated a mediating position between 
the satisfaction and moral influence theories in A Defense of the 
Catholic Faith Concerning the Satisfaction of Christ Against Faustus 
Socinus." He portrayed Christ's death not as a satisfaction of the 
strict demands of justice but as an exemplary punishment designed 
to induce faith and obedience through fear. 86 
Grotius was especially sensitive to Socinus' criticism that satisfaction 
leaves no room for forgiveness, yet he realized scripture clearly depicts 
Christ's death as penal. To resolve this tension, Grotius worked a 
compromise between justice and mercy by viewing Christ's death as 
a lesser substitute for the full satisfaction of justice. By relaxing the 
demands of justice God was able to exercise justice and mercy. 
81. The Atonement, ch. xiii. 
82. The Institutes of the Christian Religion, bk. 3, ch. i, para. I. 
83. I Corinthians 12:12-31; Ephesians 2:11-22; Colossians 1:21-23. 
84. See infra at 39-46. 
85. A Defence of the Catholic Faith Concerning the Satisfaction of Christ, 
against Faustus Socinus; John Miley in The Atonement in Christ (1880), gives 
perhaps the most systematic and comprehensive defense of the governmental view 
by a Wesleyan Arminian. Grotius identified with ~he theology of Jacobus Arminius, 
which generally attempts to be a mediating position between Calvinism and Socin-
ianism. Although not all theologians identified as Arminian hold to the governmental 
view,. Miley argues that it is the only view consistent with Arminian theology .. Wiley 
provides a useful analysis of the atonement views of several Arminian theologians, 
some of whom attempt a mediating position between the satisfaction and govern-
mental views. H. Orton Wiley, Christian Theology (1940), pp. 252-59. 
86. A Defence of the Catholic Faith Concerning the Satisfaction of Christ, 
against Faustus Socinus, pp. 106-7. 
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Grotius believed that in matters of justice God holds the office of 
ruler not judge, creditor, or sovereign lord." Rulers have the 
prerogative of exacting or remitting punishment. 88 However, it is not 
a personal prerogative akin to a creditor's in forgiving debt. He may 
exercise it only in the best interests of the community. 89 God chose 
Christ's death as the most efficient means of deterring lawlessness, 
through a demonstration of his hatred of sin and determination to 
punish it, without totally destroying man. Socinus and Grotius shared 
the critical premise that justice, being a product of God's will rather 
than an essential attribute of his nature, is mutable.90 
Making an analogy to, and drawing terminology from, the Roman 
civil law, Grotius argued that this relaxation of the law is in fact a 
"satisfaction. " 91 But he meant something very different than the 
Reformers meant by that term. Grotius agreed that justice would be 
satisfied ipso facto if all were consigned to eternal punishment ·as 
they deserve. But since God accepted Christ's death in place of man's 
eternal death, he was free to place other requirements as a condition 
of forgiveness. His condition for salvation is man's meritorious 
exercise of faith in God. The fear of punishment invoked by the 
specter of Christ's death restrains lawlessness and induces men to 
exercise saving faith. 92 For Grotius, salvation is conditioned upon a 
meritorious act of man and is not a free gift of God. 
Grotius adhered to Arminian theology which teaches that man's 
nature is not so corrupted by Adam's sin that he is unable to exercise 
87. Ibid., p. 51. 
88. Ibid., pp. 55-64. 
89. Ibid., p. 64: 
[B]ut the right of punishing does not exist for the sake of him who punishes, 
but for the sake of the community. For all punishment has as its object the 
common good, viz. the preservation of order, and giving an example; so that 
desirable punishment has no justification except this cause, while the right of 
property and debt are desirable in themselves. 
90. Ibid., p. 75: 
It is a great error to be afraid, as some are, lest in making such a concession 
we do injU:ry to God, as if we made him mutable. The law is not something 
internal within God, or the will of God itself, but only an effect of that will. 
It is perfectly certain that the effects of the divine will are mutable. 
But Grotius makes the same application of principle to Christ's death, quoting 
approviitgly several of the Church Fathers that Christ's death was not necessary. 
Ibid., p. 103. 
91. Ibid., pp. 121-27. 
92. Ibid., pp. 127-28. 
238 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF JURISPRUDENCE (1993) 
some positive spiritual good!' All men have the present natural 
ability to repent and exercise saving faith without the immediate 
supernatural work of the Holy Spirit.94 Repentance and faith actually 
precede regeneration in this view!' Man's meritorious acts are decisive 
in effecting his salvation, though he can be powerfully influenced by 
the example of Christ's suffering and death. In such a system, the 
primary effect of Christ's death is to change man's disposition toward 
God and not God's toward man. 
In order to answer Socinus' second criticism, that it is unjust to 
punish an innocent Christ in the place of guilty man, Grotius did 
not appeal to the mystery of a special spiritual union of Christ and 
his elect. Quite surprisingly, he argued that there is nothing in the 
law of nature or customs of nations that prohibits such a practice.% 
Scriptural injunctions to the contrary were mere positive law applicable 
only to Israel." For the community good, a ruler may punish an 
innocent man who bears a special relationship to the offender, such 
as father and son, for the purpose of deterring others." 
While Grotius ostensibly sought to defend the satisfaction theory, 
he actually embraced the principles of the moral influence theory. 
Grotius and Socinus concurred that punitive justice is merely a matter 
of God's will remissible without satisfaction. In Arminian and Socinian 
theology, Christ's death is unnecessary for man's salvation, but 
repentance and faith are a meritorious condition of forgiveness and 
remission of punishment. 99 Both the governmental and moral influence 
theories of atonement are essentially utilitarian in nature. Christ's 
death was chosen as the most efficient means of inducing a change 
93. A.A. Hodge, Outlines of Theology (reprint 1972) (1879), p. 334. Some 
Arminians believe this is so because man's nature was only partially corrupted by 
the fall. Others believe there was a total corruption but that the effect of the 
atonement was to raise all men to the level of partial corruption. Arminianism 
attempts to be a mediating position between Pelagianism (man is unaffected by 
Adam's sin) and Augustinianism (man is totally corrupted by Adam's sin). 
94. John Miley, Systematic Theology (reprint 1989), vol. 2, p. 244; See also 
ibid., vol. I, p. 522. 
95. Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 251-52. 
96. A Defence of the Catholic Faith Concerning the Satisfaction .of Christ, 
against Faustus Socinus, pp. 81-101. 
97. Ibid., pp. 83-84. 
98. Ibid., p. 86. 
99. Although Grotius charged Socinus with improperly applying the Roman 
private law doctrine of acceptilatio to the atonement, Grotius in principle does the 
same thing. See The Polish Brethren, pp. 256, 282-83 n.25, 285 n.80. See also The 
Work of Christ, pp. 401, 417. In effect, Arminianism and Socinianism both reject 
the chief cornerstone of the Reformation that "salvation is by grace rather than 
-- .... 
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in man through natural means of moral example rather than by the 
supernatural work of the Holy Spirit. 
C. DETERRENCE 
Rehabilitation parallels the moral influence theory and deterrence 
the governmental theory. Although rehabilitation has been the favored 
utilitarian theory of criminologists, deterrence has enjoyed a certain 
preeminence in philosophical discussions. For this reason deterrence 
is discussed first, and then rehabilitation. This is a reversal of the 
order in which their corresponding theories of atonement were 
presented. The deterrence theory holds that persons should be 
punished, on the occasion of their conviction, to deter them (special 
deterrence) or others (general deterrence) from future crimes through 
fear of punishment.")() Change of behavior, not change of character, 
is the focus. 
The deterrence theory finds its modern roots in Jeremy Bentham's 
(1849-1832) classic formulation of utilitarianism. Actions are justified 
which produce the greatest pleasure for the greatest number. As man 
possesses rationality and free will, he seeks to maximize his pleasure 
and minimize his pain. The state can alter behavior of the populace 
by raising the risk and pain of exemplary punishment to the point 
it outweighs the pleasure of some forbidden act. 101 Since punishment 
is always seen as evil, even when imposed on the guilty, it is justified 
only when it prevents a greater evil. 
The chief practical criticism of deterrence is that it has never 
proven effective. Of the few scientific studies conducted, most deal 
with capital punishment, many are methodologically flawed, and they 
draw contradictory conclusions. 102 Andenaes, perhaps the leading 
proponent of deterrence, acknowledges that there is no evidence of 
special deterrence. However, he appeals to common sense and 
experience claiming that punishment works as a general deterrent 
even though he admits there is no way the claim can be proven. 103 
100. Jobs Andenaes, "General Prevention-Illusion or Reality?" 43 J. Crim. L., 
C & P.S. (1952), pp. 176, 179-80. Andenaes responds to the charge that deterrence 
is a shallow theory of punishment based only on fear. 
101. J. Bentham, The Rationale of Punishment (1830), pp. 19-41, quoted in 
Criminal Law, pp. 8-9. 
102. Crime, Guilt, and Punishment, pp. 8-12. Ten and others rely heavily on 
Deterrence and Incapacitation: Estimating the Effects of Criminal Sanctions on 
Crime Rates (Alfred Blumstein et al., eds. 1978). 
103. Johannes Andenaes, "The General Preventive Effects of Punishment," 114 
U. Pa. L. Rev. (1966), p. 949. 
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The primary theoretical criticism of deterrence is that it justifies 
punishing the innocent and places. no inherent limit on the amount 
of punishment, thus violating the principles of blameworthiness and 
proportionality .104 Since all punishment is evil, whether imposed on 
the innocent or guilty, it is justified only if it results in a net 
maximization of pleasure or minimization of pain. The evil of 
punishing an innocent person could be outweighed by the evil prevented 
in deterring crime. Similarly, severely punishing a petty offender is 
justified if that evil is outweighed by the cumulative effect of deterring 
many petty offenders. 
One response to this criticism is that inflicting suffering on the 
innocent is not punishment. This leaves the basic moral issues 
unresolved. What justifies inflicting suffering on the innocent? 105 The 
second response is to claim that there is never a utilitarian advantage 
in punishing the innocent as less obvious evils will result. The debate 
takes the form of posing hypotheticals and counter-hypotheticals 
designed to show that the greater good will, or will not, be promoted 
by punishing the innocent. The hypotheticals that present seemingly 
clear situations in which it is beneficial to punish the innocent are 
extremely unlikely to occur. This leads to a third response that it is 
only in fantastic situations that it is beneficial to punish the innocent. 
Ten's analysis of the debate is rather convincing in its conclusion 
that the use of fantastic examples plays a legitimate role.I'16 
In an attempt to resolve the problems of blameworthiness and 
proportionality, several writers have offered compromise theories 
incorporating retributive principles. H.L.A. Hart's theory, 
distinguishing punishment as a general justifying aim based on utility 
from distribution of punishment based on retributive principles, is 
the best known. 107 He believes that the utility of deterrence is the 
only rational justification for punishment in general. However, 
distribution of punishment in individual cases is limited by 
blameworthiness and proportionality. The state may punish only the 
guilty, and only so much as they deserve, regardless of the social 
gain of exceeding those limits. At the cost of theoretical inconsistency 
104. Crime, Guilt, and Punishment, pp. 13-14, 141; Punishment and Responsi-
bility, pp. 24-25, 233-37. . 
105. Crime, Guilt, and Punishment, pp. 14-17. 
106. Ibid., pp. 17-18. 
107. Punishment and Responsibility, pp. 1-27. For other compromise theories see 
Crime, Guilt, and Punishment, pp. 78-81; John Rawls, "Two Concepts of Rules," 
Philosophical Review (1955), p. 4, reprinted in The Philosophy of Punishment (H.B. 
Acton, ed. 1969), p. 105. 
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Hart disposes of one problem only to acquire the retributivist's main 
problem of determining how much punishment is "deserved" as an 
upper limit. 
These criticisms avoid the most fundamental weakness of deterrence 
and all utilitarian approaches-the unsuitability of empiricism as a 
viable methodology for social study and prediction. 10' 
D. REHABILITATION 
For nearly a century (1870-1970) the rehabilitation theory held 
sway as the "enlightened" rationale for corrections. Crime is viewed 
as pathological, requiring treatment based on a medical model of 
diagnosis and prescription.H" A sentence is designed to "effect changes 
in the characters, attitudes, and behavior of convicted offenders, so 
as to strengthen the social defense against unwanted behavior, but 
also to contribute to the welfare and satisfactions of offenders." 110 
Rehabilitation is generally premised on a deterministic view of behavior 
found in the positivist school of criminology. Theories of crime 
causation vary from individualistic factors of biology and psychology 
to social forces."' 
Despite a deterministic view of human nature, professionals engaged 
in the healing process have acquired the free will necessary to remold 
others by means of education, counseling, psychotherapy, and 
vocational training. 112 More radical treatment includes electroshock, 
drug therapy, and psychosurgery (lobotomies).'" Although socio-
economic factors are generally considered the major cause of crime, 
the approach is not to change society so much as to enable individuals 
to cope successfully within the established order .114 However, because 
society is at fault it has a corresponding duty to provide programmatic 
cures. Those treatment programs which promote the greatest reduction 
in crime at the least cost are justified. 
108. Infra at 47-50. 
109. George B. Void & Thomas J. Bernard, Theoretical Criminology (3d ed. 
1986), pp. 350-51. 
110. Francis A. Allen, The Decline of.the Rehabilitative Ideal (1981), p. 2. 
Ill. Theoretical Criminology, cbs. I, 3·14. Void deals with biological causes in 
cbs. 3-6, psychological in ch. 7, and social in cbs. 8-14. See The Decline of the 
Rehabilitative Ideal, pp. 40-42. 
112. Ibid., pp. 11-16, 43; Crime and Its Victims, pp. 74-80; Theoretical Crimi-
nology, pp. 350-51. 
113. The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal, p. 25; Fred Cohen, The Law of 
Deprivation of Liberty (1980), pp. 540-47. 
114. See Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (1957). 
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The demise of the rehabilitation theory is due to a loss of faith in 
the ability to rehabilitate 115 and ideological attacks by critical 
criminologists of the extreme left. 116 Perhaps the single greatest blow 
to the theory was Robert Martinson's research and conclusions that 
nothing works. m 
While the layman's perception of rehabilitation is that it is too 
soft on criminals, most scholarly criticism focuses on the fact that 
in practice it is cruel and arbitrary.U' Because diagnosis and treatment 
is necessarily an ongoing process based on a cumulation of knowledge 
about the inmate, sentences must be indeterminate. The inmate's 
cooperation in mandatory programs designed to change his character 
is the condition of release. Because sentencing decisions are not based 
on culpability there is great disparity in prison terms, thus violating 
the principle of proportionality. Convicts especially hate the process 
because they deem it unfair. 
A consistent application of the rehabilitative premise that criminals 
are not morally responsible would work a drastic change in criminal 
law and procedure. Every offense would be strict liability as attention 
shifts from mens rea to the question of whether a defendant did 
·certain acts or caused a particular harm.n• Mental state, if relevant 
at all, would be determined by mental health experts as part of a 
treatment program. Writers have expended much effort to make the 
basic doctrines of mens rea and defenses compatible with the utilitarian 
ethics of deterrence and rehabilitation. 12o 
Likewise, procedural safeguards such as proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt and the privilege against self incrimination, which make it 
more difficult to identify the sick, make little sense. Nor would it 
make sense to initiate proceedings only after a crime is committed if 
115. See The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal. pp. 26-31. 
116. Ibid., pp. 34-40, 64-65; Theoretical Criminology, chs. 15 & 16; William 
Chambliss, "Toward a Radical Criminology," in The Politics of Law (David Kairys, 
ed. 1982), p. 230. 
117 .. Robert Martinson, "What Works? Questions and Answers About Prison 
Reform," 35 Pub. Int. (Spring 1974), p. 22. His views were modified in "New 
Findings, New Views: A Note of Caution Regarding Sentencing Reform," 7 Hofstra 
L. Rev. (1979), p. 243. 
118. The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal, pp.· 47-54; C.S. Lewis, "The Hu-
manitarian Theory of Punishment," 3 20th Century (Autumn 1948-49), p. 5, 
reprinted in Theories of Punishment, p. 301. 
119. Barbara Wootton, Crime and the Criminal Law (1963). This approach is 
critiqued in Punishment and Responsibility, pp. 195-209 and Crime, Guilt, and 
Punishment, pp. 110-22. 
120. Crime, Guilt, and Punishment, pp. 86-122; Punishment and Responsibility, 
pp. 28-53, 113-57. 
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there is reason to believe a person will commit a crime. Logically, a 
comprehensive system of civil commitment would divest criminal law 
and procedure. 121 
Deterrists have criticized rehabilitation because its effect is limited 
to convicts and has no impact on potential offenders. The 
rehabilitationist might respond that a rational policy would include 
a preventive program of social hygiene that encompasses all potential 
offenders. It is plausibly argued that this makes more sense than 
trying to control the entire population through fear. 
The radical left attacks these "mainline" liberals for betraying 
those it claims to champion. Rehabilitationists maintain a system 
designed to inculcate middle class values and belief in the neutrality 
of law .122 Worse yet they do. it to protect their own vested personal 
and economic interests in the government bureaucracy. Radicals 
believe crime is not a matter of individual pathology, but rather the 
ability of dominant groups to define the conduct of dominated groups 
as criminal. 123 The entire social structure must be altered, replacing 
domination with solidarity. 
Utilitarian criminal sanctions, just like utilitarian theories of 
atonement, are primarily designed to effect a change in the offender 
rather than to satisfy justice. Justice and reconciliation become nearly 
synonymous with social order, and law is the immediate instrument 
to that end. Both deterrence and rehabilitation sever law from 
morality, though in different ways. Deterrence views man as a free 
and rational decision-maker who acts on a hedonistic principle of 
maximizing pleasure rather than the rationality of ethical discernment 
of right and wrong. The state is therefore able to alter social behavior 
by manipulating pain and pleasure through the instrumentality of 
law. The rehabilitationist views man as a product of deterministic 
forces, or as sick rather than morally blameworthy. Treatment is 
then little more than behavioral conditioning designed to enforce 
social conformity through the instrumentality of law. The logic of 
both is perfectly compatible with the positivist view that law has no 
necessary moral content. 
Both Grotius and Socinus believed that Christ's death was an 
unnecessary, but highly expedient, means to change man and preserve 
order. Utilitarian civil sanctions, like Christ's death, are selected for 
121. N. Kittrie, "The Divestment of Criminal Law and the Coming of the 
Therapeutic State," I Suffolk U. L. Rev. (1967), pp. 43, 44. 
122. See Theoretical Criminology, p. 13; See also Chambliss, "Toward a Radical 
Criminology. •' 
123. E.g., Void & Bernard, supra note 109, at 15. 
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their expediency to a particular end. These utilitarian views of 
atonement were quite compatible with, and perhaps smoothed the 
way for, an emerging view of the state which was becoming less 
concerned with exaction of perfect justice in individual cases, and 
more concerned with law as an instrument for advancing a particular 
vision of the common good. 124 
Just as Arminian and Socinian theology confuse the work of Christ 
and the Holy Spirit, utilitarian views of civil justice confuse the roles 
of state and church. In neither is the immediate supernatural work 
of the Holy Spirit crucial for reconciliation, but rather the exemplary 
impact of Christ's death by means of fear and moral suasion is 
decisive. Both of these are essentially natural means of reformation, 
equally available to the state, undermining the church's institutional 
distinctiveness. As the church compromises its ministry of 
reconciliation, the state assumes it to the eventual neglect of its 
ministry of justice. 
Ill. COMMUNITARIAN THEORIES OF ATONEMENT AND CIVILJUSTICE 
A. MYSTICAL THEORY OF ATONEMENT 
The mystical theory is like the moral influence in that Christ's 
death plays no essential role in man's salvation, and atonement is 
exclusively a subjective change in man. The crucial difference is that 
in the mystical theory this change . occurs because the incarnation 
effects a mystical union between God and man that imparts a new 
principle of life. The mystical theory has been a recurring one in 
Church history;m however, until the nineteenth century it found 
neither widespread allegiance nor comprehensive development. This 
changed dramatically when the "father of modern theology," Friedrich 
Schleiermacher (1768-1834), articulated a mystical view of Christ's 
person and work in The Christian Faith. 126 
Schleiermacher rejected the natural theology of Enlightenment 
rationalism and Protestant orthodoxy. He defined true religion as 
the sense of absolute dependence (God-consciousness), which is known 
immediately through feeling and contemplation. This feeling of 
absolute dependence is the veritable and essential existence of God 
124. The Words of Christ, pp. 404-09. 
125. See Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, (photolithoprint 1979) (1892) vol. 
2, pp. 581-89; The Institutes of the Christian Religion, bk. 2, ch xii, paras. 5-7; 
The Work of Christ, pp. 327-33; 361n.9; 54ln.3. 
126. F. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith (D. Bailie et al., trans. 1928) (1st ed. 
1821, 2d ed. 1831). 
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in man. 127 Sin is the failure to hold a conscious awareness of one's 
unity with God and absolute dependence on him. According to 
Schleiermacher, man is both spirit which is inherently God-conscious, 
and flesh which lacks God-consciousness. 128 Because flesh develops 
earlier than spirit it retards the development of God-consciousness. 129 
When spirit becomes aware that flesh is retarding its determinative 
power, man experiences guilt and suffering.130 
This condition is man's created nature and is not the penal 
consequence of Adam's sin."' Adam's sin, like everyone's, was 
trivial, but it has a social impact that further encumbers the individual's 
struggle for God-consciousness. Schleiermacher believed that sin "is 
best represented as the corporate act and the corporate guilt of the 
human race." 132 To deny corporate guilt would throw man upon his 
individual resources for salvation.'" 
Schleiermacher believed that all men are conscious of their need 
for a Redeemer. Christ the Redeemer differs from other men "by 
the constant potency of his God-consciousness. " 134 By the incarnation 
Christ entered into the common life of humanity, participating in it 
and communicating his God-consciousness to it. He assumes man 
into the power of his God-consciousness (redemption)"' and into his 
127. Ibid., p. 17. 
128. Schleiermacher believed that there are three grades of consciousness. The 
lowest is that of animals and children. Although this state is unknown to us, it is 
generally agreed that while there is consciousness, it is not the kind that is objective 
or introspective, or that makes a distinction between self and others. The second 
stage involves a genuine self-consciousness. At this stage self-consciousness experi-
ences a conflict between feelings of dependence and freedom. Schleiermacher's flesh-
spirit dichotomy is not a Manichean dualism of material and non-material, nor the 
orthodox Christian view of conflict between the remaining sin nature and new life 
in the Spirit. Rather, it is the inability of the feeling of absolute dependence or 
God-consciousness to control. Ibid., pp. 18-20. The third grade is absolute depend-
ence or God-consciousness. 
129. Ibid., p. 274. 
130. Ibid., pp. 355-61. 
131. Ibid., p. 291. 
132. Ibid., p. 285. See also Ibid., pp. 287-88: 
Now if the sinfulness which is prior to all action operates in every individual 
through the sin and sinfulness of others, and if, again, it is transmitted by the 
voluntary actions of every individual to others and implanted within them, it 
must be something genuinely common to all . ... This solidarity means an 
interdependence of all places and all times in the respect we have in view . .. . 
(A]nd the aggregate power of the flesh in its conflict with the spirit ... is 
intelligible only by reference to the totality of those sharing a common life, 
and never fully in any one part. ... 
133. Ibid., p. 289. 
134. Ibid., p. 385. 
135. Ibid., p. 425. 
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blessedness, alleviating the suffering of guilt (reconciliation). 136 Christ 
continues to exert a saving influence by an immediate communication 
of God-consciousness through the church. Therefore, it is now through 
union with the community that individuals are assumed into Christ's 
God-consciousness and experience union with God.B' 
Because Schleiermacher's salvation is a purely subjective work in 
man, accomplished by Christ alone, there is no place for the distinctive 
person and work of the Holy Spirit. He uses standard theological 
terms such as "regeneration," "justification," and "sanctification" 
to refer to nothing more than Christ's redeeming activities.'" There 
is real doubt as to whether even Christ and the church play an 
essential role in man's salvation since every individual and community 
has the potential to develop, and assume others into, God-
consciousness.'" It may be fair to say that man is already reconciled 
to God and he need only become consciously aware of that reality. 
Since Schleiermacher, modernism has taken many theological forms 
including liberalism 140 and neo-orthodoxy .'41 They have in common 
a purely subjective effect of the work of Christ. Although no single 
school dominates the theological landscape today, the Latin American 
form of process theology, known as liberation theology, is of special 
interest because of its influence and explicit relation to civil justice. 
It teaches that salvation comes in siding with the oppressed in their 
struggle for liberation. Most criticism focuses on its attendant Marxist 
social, economic, and political ideology without doing full justice to 
its underlying theology. Leonardo Boff's Jesus Christ Liberator, 142 is 
the most comprehensive articulation of a liberation Christo logy. 
136. Ibid., p. 431. 
137. Ibid., p. 363: 
[T]he recognition of the sinless perfection in Jesus Christ, definitely constraining 
us to the new corporate life, must in the same Way be still His work. But there 
is given to us instead of His personal influence, only that of His fellowship, in 
so far as even the picture of Him which is found in the Bible also originated 
in the community and is perpetuated in it. 
138. Ibid., p. 477. 
139. Ibid., p. 563: 
The unity of the Spirit is to be understood in' the same sense as the unity which 
everyone attributes to the characteristic form taken by human nature in a 
nation; even those who ascribe being only to the separate individual may still 
say that each man's personality is the national character modified by the original 
basis of his own nature. 
See also Ibid., pp. 34-39, 62-76. 
140. See generally James C. Livingston, Modern Christian Thought: From the 
Enlightenment to Vatican II, (1971), pp. 251-57, 262-68. 
141. Cornelius Van Til, Barth's Christo/ogy (1977) (assessment of Karl Barth's 
Christology as mystical). 
142. Leonardo Boff, Jesus Christ Liberator (trans., 1978). 
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Boff says that the world is growing in complexity, unity and 
consciousness as it proceeds through a series of stages culminating 
in the divinization of man and the humanization of God. 143 Sin is 
viewed as a lack of unity, or alienation of one from another, resulting 
in the domination of some groups by others. Although oppressive 
social structures may reinforce alienation, the root cause of sin is 
the fact that mankind has not progressed past the stage of 
anthropogenesis to Christogenesis. There is an animating principle 
of harmony in the cosmos which has always worked unconsciously 
but apparently teleologically. It is now working with a growing sense 
of self-consciousness in man. that enables him to direct the course of 
progress toward universal solidarity, and thus, sinlessness. 144 Jesus 
acts as something of a catalyst permeating mankind with a sense of 
community that increases man's self-conscious directing powers."' 
Christ is sinless by virtue of the fact that he lived with a conscious 
awareness of the harmony of the world, and he works to liberate 
victims of sin by establishing a classless solidarity.I'6 He is the ultimate 
human being that all will become. 147 Having penetrated the world, 
Jesus mystically entered the unconsciousness of mankind and is now 
present in all reality "acting and fermenting the goodness, humanity, 
brotherhood, communion, and love in all human beings.""' His 
death was unnecessary and certainly had no penal significance, yet 
it displayed his solidarity with the poor and love for their oppressors. 
Because the poor are especially close to God, and he lies "hidden 
and anonymous" in them, the most direct access to God is through 
union with them. 149 Active participation in the cause of the poor is 
the way of salvation, and Christ is present in those who further their 
cause."0 The commitment of one's life to the oppressed results in 
143. Ibid., pp. 185, 197. 
144. Ibid., pp. 234-35: 
Cosmogenesis gave rise to biogenesis, anthropogenesis emerged from biogenesis, 
and from anthropogenesis there emerged Christogenesis . ... The reality that 
surrounds us is not a chaos but a cosmos, a harmony. The more it progresses 
the more complex it becomes; the more c9mplex it becomes the more it is 
unified, the more it is unified the more it becomes conscious of itself . ... In 
this perspective, the human being does not emerge as an error in calculation 
... but as the point where the global process becomes conscious of itself and 
begins to direct itself. 
145. Ibid., p. 24. 
146. Ibid., p. 202. 
147. Ibid., p. 241. 
148. Ibid., p. 218. 
149. Ibid., pp. 284-85. 
150. Ibid., p. 219. 
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the formation of "a planetary, ecumenical, and communal 
consciousness among people in search of a new humanism."'" 
Boff gives no specific description of this new order except that it 
will be free of domination and alienation, and man will hold 
membership in a universal rather than a particular family. 152 Such a 
world will not be governed by law but only a love "that bind[s] 
human beings with more liberating ties than those of the law."'" 
God does not speak to man revealing a plan for society or in 
propositional truths. Only when we insert ourselves into Christ's life 
and the cause of the oppressed can we begin to comprehend the 
meaning and unity of the new order of existence. "4 
B. SociAL JusTICE 
Social justice is an ambiguous term invoked for its emotional 
appeal in promoting a vast array of programs designed to make 
society just.'" It differs from the other theories in that it uses state 
coercion, usually to redistribute property or impair liberty, without 
any adjudication of wrongdoing. This multiplies the rehabilitationist's 
techniques of social control and applies them to the entire populace.'" 
Rather than using the adjudication of wrongs as an occasion to 
promote some vision of the good, the state engages in an increasingly 
comprehensive, continuous, and purposive intervention in all social 
affairs. Regardless of the source of a problem, social justice demands 
that the state take corrective action.'" 
The frrst large-scale social justice program was compulsory schooling 
with its now flickering hope of curing most social ills.'" In this 
century, regulation of the economy gave rise to the administrative 
state, redistribution of property gave rise to the welfare state and 
institutional care gave rise to the therapeutic state. The focus of 
151. Ibid., p. 236. 
152. Ibid., p. 77. 
153. Ibid., p. 195. 
154. Ibid., p. 182. 
155. "The absence of a dominant theorist or a single commanding system of 
thought endorsing the welfaie state has been documented again and again." Sidney 
Hook, "'Welfare State'-a Debate that Isn't," in The Welfare State (E.I. Schottland, 
ed. 1967), p. 167, quoted in Ronald H. Nash, Social Justice and the Christian 
Church (1983), p. 59. 
156. Kittrie, "The Divestment of Criminal Law and the Coming of the Therapeutic 
State," pp. 54-55. 
!57. F.A. Hayek, New Studies (1978), p. 110. 
158. See E.I.F. Williams, Horace Mann: Educational Statesman (1937), pp. 248· 
49, quoting from "Introduction," 3 The Common Sch. J. (Jan. 1, 1841), p. 15. 
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justice has shifted from equality of opportunity to equality of 
position.159 At the same time, criminologists shifted attention to social ·• 
causes of crime. Since society is at fault it must redress the problems 
of illiteracy, poverty, housing, unemployment, malnutrition, substance 
abuse, and broken homes. The state usurps the role of families, 160 
church, and voluntary associations, which in turn default on their 
responsibilities with the ready excuse that only the state has adequate 
professional skills and resources to deal with the problems.161 
There are two types of attack on social justice theories, the first 
being that by every standard of measurement nothing works. The 
second type of attack is ideological in nature. Pervasive state 
intervention, guided only by the utilitarian goal of maximizing net 
social gains, threatens individual liberty. 161 John Rawls' celebrated 
treatise, A Theory of Justice, 163 attempts to resolve the conflict 
between individual liberty and the redistributive ethic of utilitarianism. 
Rawls distinguishes activities governed by the principle of liberty 
which can never be compromised, from economic rights which may 
be sacrificed for the common good. 164 He develops these two principles 
from an imaginary social contract which everyone could agree to. 
The institution of compulsory education, potentially the greatest 
threat to liberty, will presumably play the indispensable role of 
ensuring allegiance to the two principles. The extreme political left 
is also critical of state-imposed values, however, their complaint is 
not so much against imposed values as it is with the content of the 
values being imposed. 
Utilitarian theories of justice have not worked, and they conflict 
with certain shared notions of fairness, yet they enjoy the continuing 
159. See Edgar Bodenheimer, Jurisprudence: The Philosophy and Method of the 
Law (1974), pp. 229-36. 
160. See The Decline· of the Rehabilitative Ideal, pp. 15, 20-21. 
161. "The Divestment of Criminal Law and the Coming of the Therapeutic 
State," p. 56; A. A. Stone, Mental Health and Law: A System in Transition(l915), 
pp. 1-6, excerpted in The Law of Deprivation of Liberty, pp. 214ff. 
162. The tension that exists between individual liberty and social justice notions 
of the common good is addressed in Jurisprudence: The Philosophy and Method 
of the Law, pp. 240.45. 
163. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971). 
164. Rawls' two principles are: 
First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty 
compatible with a similar liberty for others. 
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are 
both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached 
to positions and offices open to all. Ibid., p. 60. 
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perception of being empirically verifiable, and therefore, scientific. 165 
This is based on the pretension that given time the "social sciences" 
will make the same types of evaluations and predictions as the natural 
sciences. In reality, there are a seemingly infinite number of variables, 
most of which cannot be controlled for purposes of experimentation, 
making it impossible to trace cause-effect relations of social 
phenomena. Therefore, it is impossible to empirically predict the 
effect of social policy decisions. Without proving a theory of causation, 
policy-makers set out to treat the entire populace by prescription. 
The fact that the 'entire enterprise is based on· empirically unproven 
and unprovable assumptions is usually ignored. 
Not only is the utilitarian unable to select an efficient means to 
the desired end, he is unable to justify a particular end as good. 
Even if there is a shared vision of the good, there is no assurance 
that it is "good" indeed and would not be more painful than 
pleasurable. This problem becomes especially critical as social 
consensus regarding "the good" breaks down. 166 Although utilitarian 
theories have enjoyed relative immunity to criticism at these 
fundamental points, Roberto Unger attests the desperate predicament 
of the prevailing methodology: 
If he [the historicist] wants to maintain clear lines of causality, in 
which cause and effect are neatly matched in one-to-one sequences, 
he has to tear certain events out of the "seamless web" of history, 
in which everything seems to bear on everything else. But in so 
doing he willfully disfigures the truth of history which it is his 
aim to establish .... 
Suppose the historicist refuses to sacrifice complex historical 
truth on the altar of one-way causation. . . . Having discovered 
that all things cause each other in social life, as in the world at 
large, he wants to find a way to represent this insight in what he 
says about society. Alas, his eagerness is self-defeating. The more 
causes he takes into account, the less he is able to distinguish 
discrete relationships of cause and effect. In the end, the very 
notion of causality flounders in ambiguity .167 
Unger also rejects rationalism and individual subjectivism, 168 and 
in his search for a suitable methodology for social study, concludes 
165. See, e.g., Theoretical Criminology, pp. 36, 340-363; "The Divestment of 
Criminal Law and the Coming of the Therapeutic State," pp. 58-60. 
166. The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideals, pp. 36-37. 
167. Law in Modern Society, pp. 12-13. 
168. Ibid., pp. 1-23. 
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Knowledge and Politics with a petition for divine revelation.'" One 
possible solution to the problem of knowing anything truly without 
knowing everything is that God, the omniscient Creator, has revealed 
truth to man, his creation. It does not appear that Unger's prayer 
is directed to the God of orthodox Christianity. Unger believes that 
in order to solve the knowledge problem we must resolve the problem 
of social order, which is the reconciliation of man. 
Perhaps the fundamental problem to be resolved in all thought is 
the relationship of universals and particulars. In political and social 
discourse it takes the form of the relationship of the individual to 
the group. How can you have community without destroying individual 
freedom? The problem appears rooted .in the nature of things. 
Consciousness is a person's awareness that he (subject) is separate 
from others (object). "Otherness" creates two problems. First, 
another's freedom places limits on our own freedom. Secondly, there 
is no assurance that object and subject share the same perspective 
or attribute the same meaning to events. Alienation is a product of 
this basic reality of "separateness." Resolving these problems and 
working toward "the ideal of a universal community, is the great 
political task of modern societies,"170 but "[a]ll moves toward such 
a community may be compromised by the separateness of persons." 171 
Unger writes that the ideology of nineteenth-century liberal society 
was one in which men were "governed by self-interest" and used 
the "most efficient means to achieve privately chosen aims. " 172 
According to Unger, social cohesion was supposedly based on 
impersonal respect, rather than solidarity and a shared vision of 
good. The role of law was to ensure individual rights as a protection 
against the state, to mediate private disputes, and to influence private 
decisions by sanctions. The rule of law is based on the belief that 
law is mutually beneficial, neutral and objective. In such a society 
there is no true community, and law merely accentuates and reinforces 
169. Roberto M. Unger, Knowledge and Politics (1984), p. 295: 
Desirous of faith, touched by hope, and moved by love, men look unceasingly 
for God. Their search for Him continues where thinking must stop and action 
fail. And in their vision of Him they find the beginning and the end of their 
knowledge of the world and of their sympathy for others. So is man's meditation 
on God a final union of thought and love-love which is thought disembodied 
from language and restored to its source. 
But our days pass, and still we do not know you fully. Why then do you 
remain silent? Speak, God. 
170. Law in Modern Society, p. 266. 
171. Ibid., p. 258. 
172. Ibid., p. 24. 
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separateness. The role of law in the post-liberal welfare-corporate 
state has changed. A social order based on private interest is no 
longer viewed as natural, and the belief that law is neutral and 
objective is questioned. With the rise of policy-oriented legal reasoning 
and substantive justice, rights are less a protection of individuals and 
more of a justification for the state's purposive reordering of the 
social order. Property and contract rights are no longer seen as 
neutral, but rather as political instruments of the established powers. 173 
Unger believes that this changing perception of law reflects a 
change in social consciousness that is giving expression to a desire 
for community. There can be no return to a rule of law because it 
is based on an individualistic conception of society. However, Unger 
warns that a continuation of the trends of the welfare-corporate state 
will be a loss of individual freedom "to a bureaucratic welfare 
tyranny that treats all social arrangements as subjects for governmental 
manipulation through regulatory law."'" Although there is a desire 
for community, current social organization and methodologies are 
not able to give expression to it. 
Unger ties the resolution of the problem of social order to the 
problem of methodology. The creation of true community, based on 
solidarity, requires a methodology we do not possess. Yet the 
development of a new methodology for social study and predication 
depends on development of community. A new methodology must 
reflect the interrelatedness of social life, eliminate determinism, and 
resolve the problem of objectivity-subjectivity. So we return to the 
question-who is the God that Unger asks to speak? 
What philosophy states as the union of the universal and the 
particular, religion knows as immanence. What philosophy de-
scribes as the separation of the universal aild the particular, religion 
calls transcendence. m 
The idea of a union of immanence and transcendence or of a 
universal being who knows and determines all particulars without 
destroying their particularity is the idea of God. 176 
Unger assumes that the resolution of the problems of social order 
and methodology lies in the human consciousness. It appears that it 
is not a subjective individual consciousness, but rather a universal 
interpersonal collective consciousness that is God. The problem of 
173. Ibid., pp. 192-220. 
174. Ibid., p. 129; see also ibid., pp. 216-23. 
175. Knowledge and Politics, p. 290. 
176. Ibid., p. 291. 
JEFFREY C. TUOMALA 253 
legitimizing a social order, and the resolution of the problem of 
meaning, is resolved because object and subject are one. This new 
order is governed by solidarity, which Unger calls the social analogue 
of love, rather than a rule of law which is predicated on a lack of 
community. 177 Solidarity means treating someone as a person and not 
just a "bearer of formally equal rights and duties." 178 
Unger trusts that there is an existing unity of all things to which 
we must be open. He also believes that there is a correspondence in 
human nature between being and goodness that cannot manifest itself 
in a context of domination. Man must act in faith upon this belief, 
and this faith is expressed through politics. 179 Politics is key to altering 
social structure through "transformative praxis" and altering the 
consciousness through the "imaginative powers of the mind." 
Community then advances through a spiral of increasing solidarity 
and decreasing domination. 180 However, awareness of unity cannot 
develop absent face-to-face relationships with other members of the 
same group across the whole spectrum of life's activities. 181 In such 
a setting, "[t]hough the law may be framed to teach men sympathy, 
all that may be hoped for in the short run is to force them, within 
wider or narrower bounds, to act as if they were sympathetic. " 182 It 
is not immediately obvious that this is preferable to a "bureaucratic 
welfare tyranny." It is also difficult to see how this resolves the 
problems of causation and objectivity-subjectivity without destroying 
freedom and the individual. 
Unger's prayer makes it clear that he recognizes the limitation of 
thought and action in effecting man's salvation. What then is to take 
place in the context of these compulsory comprehensive face-to-face 
relationships? He must reject a view of reconciliation paralleling the 
moral influence theory of atonement that would establish reconciliation 
through rationalistic devices of teaching and exemplary love. Instead, 
Unger's methodology is akin to Schleiermacher's and Boff's, requiring 
a setting in which there is an immediate mystical impartation of the 
higher consciousness from the spiritual haves to the have-nots. 
177. Law in Modern Society, pp. 206-07. 
178. Ibid., p. 206. The family is a great inspiration for this vision of community 
because in it members relate on the basis of love. In true community all members 
would relate in a similar manner. Yet Unger says the family is a foe that must be 
transformed because it competes with the universal community for the allegiance of 
its members. Knowledge and Politics, p. 264. 
179. Law in Modern Society. pp. 247-48. 
180. Knowledge and Politics. p. 239. 
181. Ibid., pp. 262-67. 
182. Law in Modern Society, p. 215. 
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In both the mystical and social justice views, issues of individual 
sin, and guilt as moral wrongs, are minimized or eliminated. The 
focus is on establishing a particular order, or effecting a change of 
relationship, without a satisfaction of justice. In effect, it is 
reconciliation without atonement and community without satisfaction 
of justice. The mystical view of atonement eliminates the duality 
between God and man, and in so doing, eliminates the separateness 
of individuals. Social justice, to overcome the problems of the 
welfare-corporate state, eliminates the separateness of individuals, 
and in so doing creates a new god. In both the mystical and social 
justice theories, corporate man and god are one. This would resolve 
the legitimacy problem that arises when some individuals or groups 
try to impose a particular order on others. However, if all are one, 
the problem of maintaining true individuality and freedom reasserts 
itself. Neither of the theories offers a convincing answer to this 
dilemma. 
Both assume that there is a basic unity, either of God and man, 
or of all men, and that the alienation they experience is not so much 
a moral problem as it is a metaphysical problem. It seems that the 
problem of alienation will be resolved when man becomes fully 
conscious of this metaphysical unity, and his oneness, with God and 
others. While Schleiermacher focuses on contemplation as the key to 
the higher consciousness, others focus on political activity as the key. 
The mystical views of atonement not only limit the importance of 
Christ's death, they are usually accompanied by a denial of the 
existence of the Holy Spirit as a distinct person in the Trinity. This 
is paralleled in the social justice theories in which the state becomes 
preeminent, consigning other institutions to irrelevance. In Unger's 
view, the logical conclusion would be that state and society are one. 
Although Unger suggests that in his new society there would be 
multiple organic groups, they appear to be nothing more than 
particular expressions of the universal community .183 There is no need 
for a church since the state plays a redemptive rather than judicial 
role. In fact, the church would have to be eliminated as it contends 
there are two communities of men-saved and unsaved. Additionally, 
orthodox Christianity, which believes there is a duality between the 
Creator and creation, would be eliminated because it provides the 
theoretical basis for the rule of law notion that there is an objective 
and neutral standard. " 4 
183. Knowledge and Politics, pp. 236-77. 
184. See Law in Modern Society, pp. 76-83. 
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CoNCLUSION 
Although my primary aim has not been to offer a comprehensive 
case for a particular view of atonement and civil justice, I have 
argued that only the satisfaction and retribution-restitution views are 
distinctly different and justifiable in terms of Christian theology and 
a biblical worldview. It is a larger and more basic matter still to 
offer a defense of one's worldview. Perhaps that is why most writers 
do not even try to articulate the basic presuppositions from which 
they work. The fact of the matter is that everyone operates on the 
basis of certain presuppositions, whether they do so self-consciously 
and honestly or not. Recognizing that these presuppositions are based 
on faith does not mean that they must be at odds with knowledge 
or operate in a separate realm. Rather we believe that we might 
know, and there is a wonderful communion between thought, action 
and faith that is properly grounded. 
For it is true that the more richly we are nourished in Holy 
Scripture by the things that feed us through obedience, the more 
accurately we are carried along to the things that satisfy through 
knowledge .... Certainly this is just what I say: He who will not 
believe will not understand. For he who will not believe will not 
gain experience, and he who has not had experience will not 
know. 18~ 
185. Anselm, "Letter of Anselm to Pope Urban II," in A Scholastic Miscellany: 
Anselm to Ockham, pp. 97, 97-98. 
